This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3x3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3x3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent...

In a setting where an infinite population of players interact locally and repeatedly, we study the impacts of payoff structures and network structures on contagion of a convention. For the "bilingual game", where each player chooses one of two conventions or adopts both (i.e., chooses the...

We show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games, an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles