Robust equilibria under non-common priors
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Oyama, Daisuke ; Tercieux, Olivier |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 145.2010, 2, p. 752-784
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Theorie | Theory |
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