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Easy Money? Managerial Power and the Option Backdating Game Revisited

Guthrie, Graeme - 2020

This paper presents a model of a firm that backdates the granting of executive stock options in order to maximize actual compensation for a given level of reported compensation. The model is used to estimate the magnitude of the difference between the actual and reported values of option grants....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857024

Management takeover battles and the role of the "golden handshake"

Fabel, Oliver; Kolmar, Martin - 2002

still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491061

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers … observed in the experiment aim at fair surplus sharing. -- principal-agent theory ; contract theory ; fair sharing ; incentive …Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 2002

We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed wages and incentives in the form of return sharing. This great contractual flexibility allows us to study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171098

Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014115840

Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition

Zhang, Zhentang - 2002

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011436367

Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests

Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2002

In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539675