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In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
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We introduce the moonlighting game. Player A can take money from or pass money to player B, who can either return money or punish player A. Thus, our game allows to study both positively and negatively reciprocal behaviour. One-shot experiments were conducted with and without the possibility of...
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enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool …-subject pool, police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games. With exogenous institutions, police commissioners … bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …
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