This study shifts attention from project-based firms (PBFs) to project network organizations (PNOs) as increasingly important interorganizational contexts of project collaboration. As a result of organizational specialization, PNOs have emerged as generic organizational forms combining the...

Previous research on functional diversity in teams has produced conflicting findings. Most research since 1992 has used counts of the number of different functions or one of two measures that apply different weights to the proportion of individuals within each functional category. Scholars have...

Using data from a large cross-section of British establishments, we ask how different firm characteristics are associated with the predicted benefits to organizational performance from using team production. To compute the predicted benefits from using team production, we estimate structural...

Am Beispiel deutschsprachiger BWL-Professoren wird untersucht, ob Führungspersonen, konkret Dekane, Prodekane und Vorsitzende von wissenschaftlichen Kommissionen des VHB, in der operativen Arbeit, hier der Forschung gemessen über Veröffentlichungen und Zitationen bei Google Scholar,...

In this paper, we examine how project entrepreneurs maintain and leverage longer-term project-based relationships in highly uncertain and volatile project businesses with clients and key service providers across ever changing collaborative contexts. Based on a thorough analysis of TV project...

Diese Dissertation enthält drei Aufsätze zur Theorie der Anreizsetzung bei nicht-verifizierbaren Leistungsmaßen. Untersuchungsgegenstand sind die Auswirkungen individueller Fairnesspräferenzen auf die Ausgestaltung und Eignung verschiedener Anreizmechanismen, welche in realen...

We analyze relational contracts for a set of agents when either (a) only aggregate output or (b) individual outputs are observable. A team incentive scheme, where each agent is paid a bonus for aggregate output above a threshold, is optimal in case (a). The team's efficiency may increase...

We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. In a situation where individuals have present-biased preferences, any effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an...

We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. If individuals have present-biased preferences, effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual's long-run self. If...