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Strategic feedback in teams : theory and experimental evidence
Ertac, Seda; Gümren, Mert; Koçkesen, Levent - 2017
FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal can provide truthful information on agents’ performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737852
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Principal-Agent Negotiations with Teams of Agents : Experimental Evidence
Whitford, Andrew B. - 2015
the principal's imposed contract. While principals governing teams of agents sometimes do use incentives, in cases where … incentives are not present - if agents trust one another - they are each more likely to contribute high effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027665
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Can higher bonuses lead to less effort? : incentive reversal in teams
Klor, Esteban F.; Kube, Sebastian; Winter, Eyal; … - 2011
Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In … with positive externalities between agents, incentive reversal might occur: an increase in monetary incentives (either … and report on two experiments that provide supportive evidence. -- incentives ; incentive reversal ; team production …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230143
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Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams
Klor, Esteban F. - 2011
Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In … with positive externalities between agents, incentive reversal might occur: an increase in monetary incentives (either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013129921
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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592940
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Heterogeneous treatment effects in groups
Riener, Gerhard; Wiederhold, Simon - 2012
We show in a laboratory experiment that the same method of group induction carries different behavioral consequences. These heterogeneous treatment effects can be directly related to the quality of the relationship established between the subjects. Our results indicate the importance of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009661288
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Team building and hidden costs of control
Riener, Gerhard; Wiederhold, Simon - 2012
This paper investigates the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. We propose a simple principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620209
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Team building and hidden costs of control
Riener, Gerhard; Wiederhold, Simon - 2012
This paper investigates the role of social identity in reactions to control. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups. Our laboratory experiment shows that, in contrast to no-group agents, agents in social groups (i) perform better;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009671871
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Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests
Benistant, Julien - 2019
Using a real-effort experiment, we study whether group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We vary whether minimal group identity is induced or not, whether individuals have to report their own outcome or the outcome of their competitor, and whether pairs of competitors share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901021
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Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests
Benistant, Julien - 2019
Using a real-effort experiment, we study whether group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We vary whether minimal group identity is induced or not, whether individuals have to report their own outcome or the outcome of their competitor, and whether pairs of competitors share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901023