The paper analyzes the interaction between an endogenous capital structure and investment decision, and the incentive scheme of bank executives. We show that the implementation of capital requirements, which are contingent on compensation schemes, drive a wedge between the interests of the...

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...

Banks must maintain a balance between their own capital and the level of accepted aggregate risk to ensure financial stability. This paradigm is expressed in terms of capital adequacy requirements to both the minimum capital required to cover regulatory risks and the risk capital required to...

This paper is aimed at providing an analysis of the recent updates which have taken place in respect of the Basel III Leverage Ratio and the Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio – both in relation to recent amendments introduced by the Basel Committee and proposals introduced in the United...

We provide a theoretical foundation for the claim that prolonged periods of easy monetary conditions increase bank risk taking. The net effect of a monetary policy change on bank monitoring (an inverse measure of risk taking) depends on the balance of three forces: interest rate pass-through,...