Risk management, soft information and bankers' incentives
Brigitte Godbillon-Camus; Christophe J. Godlewski
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Godbillon-Camus, Brigitte ; Godlewski, Christophe J. |
| Published in: |
Revue d'économie politique. - Paris : Dalloz, ISSN 0373-2630, ZDB-ID 241473-9. - Vol. 123.2013, 5, p. 763-791
|
| Subject: | risk management | value at risk | capital budgeting | capital structure | banking | soft information | manipulation | moral hazard with hidden information | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Theorie | Theory | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Risikomaß | Risk measure |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Zsfassung in franz. Sprache |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223004