We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707] model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A...

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...

We introduce a price oligopoly model with informed and uninformed consumers, thus creating a new channel of influence for collaborative R&D. Firms can establish pair-wise collaborative research links with other firms to lower production costs. Informed consumers buy from the lowest cost firms...

We introduce a price oligopoly model with informed and uninformed consumers, thus creating a new channel of influence for collaborative R&D. Firms can establish pair-wise collaborative research links with other firms to lower production costs. Informed consumers buy from the lowest cost firms...