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Interactive Unawareness and Speculative Trade
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2003
The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non- trivial forms of unawareness (Dekel, Lipman and … standard information structures with strong properties of knowledge. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263088
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Unawareness, Beliefs and Games
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2007
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276586
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Unawareness, beliefs and games
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2007
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276636
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Unawareness, beliefs and games
Heifetz, Aviad (contributor); Meier, Martin (contributor);  … - 2007
-agreeing-to-disagree" theorem. -- unawareness ; type-space ; Bayesian games ; incomplete information ; equilibrium ; common prior ; agreement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003728030
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Unawareness, beliefs and speculative trade
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2009
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894997
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Unawareness, Beliefs, and Speculative Trade
Heifetz, Aviad - 2012
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116677
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Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2011
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544213
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Information, evolution and utility
Samuelson, Larry; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704445
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Robust Information Aggregation
Veiel, Rafael - 2022
Consider an investment problem with strategic complementarities and incomplete information about returns. This paper … shows that investors aggregate their private information in equilibrium by trading a token and observing its market price … over multiple rounds before making the investment decision. This result is robust to the information environment. The paper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014239114
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Efficient Scoring of Multiple-Choice Tests
Direr, Alexis - 2020
This paper studies the optimal scoring of multiple choice tests in which the marks for wrong selection and omission jointly minimize the mean square difference between score and examinees' ability. I find that it is efficient to incentivize the lowest able to omit, except when the test has a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840409