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Subjective Performance Evaluation and Inequality Aversion
Grund, Christian; Przemeck, Judith - 2021
many supervisors tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary across employees … of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a model with a supervisor, who has preferences … costs and inequality aversion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324841
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Subjective performance evaluation and inequality aversion
Grund, Christian (contributor); Przemeck, Judith (contributor) - 2008
costs and inequality aversion. -- Appraisals ; inequality aversion ; performance evaluation ; centrality bias ; leniency … many supervisors tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary across employees … of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a model with a supervisor, who has preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003661552
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Legitimacy of Control
Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - 2007
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort require- ment? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal- agent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422159
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Legitimacy of control
Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - 2007
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort require- ment? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal- agent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592848
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Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories
Dickinson, David L.; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2021
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level whereas the "crowding-out" literature suggests that it may reduce the overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319150
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Distrust - the Hidden Cost of Control
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - 2021
We show experimentally that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents' choice set by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319211
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How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents
Ichino, Andrea; Muehlheusser, Gerd - 2021
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319537
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Subjective performance evaluation and inequality aversion
Grund, Christian; Przemeck, Judith - 2008
many supervisors tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary across employees … of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a model with a supervisor, who has preferences … costs and inequality aversion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268730
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Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2011
Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting controlcan reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows thatintention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differin their propensity for reciprocity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326255
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Intention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control
Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2011
Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277418