Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …

An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on …

to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe … information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation. …

-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties … imposed across the policy regimes. The more recent regimes are characterized by far fewer cartels prosecuted, but with … cartels to larger and multinational firms. In terms of political effects, our results reveal no clear inter-political party …

should consider mergers as potential ‘second-best’ alternative to cartels but also imply that resource (re)allocations in …

While private actions for damages by customers against price-cartels receive much attention, the treatment of other …