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Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886259

Gender and collusion

Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866

Trust, Leniency and Deterrence

Bigoni, Maria - 2014

This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement … several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050458

Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies

Gomez-Martin, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2015

to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe … information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532614

Partial cartels and mergers with heterogenous firms : experimental evidence

Gomez-Martinez, Francisco - 2017

A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive … experimentally the formation and behavior of partial cartels. The theoretical model is a variation of Bos and Harrington's (2010 … experimental study has two main objectives. The first goal is examine whether partial cartels emerge in the lab at all, and if so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761059

Minority share acquisitions and collusion : evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs

Heim, Sven; Hüschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich; … - 2017

There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the introduction of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730845

A study of the regulative acts' leniency clause effect on the behavior of the firms

Kaur, Harshil - In: Journal of governance and regulation : international … 6 (2017) 4, pp. 61-68

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011921488

Self-defeating antitrust laws: How leniency programs solve Bertrand's paradox and enforce collusion in auctions

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616

Chapter 15 Antitrust

Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 2, (pp. 1073-1225). 2007

This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495

Time is money – how much money is time? : interest and inflation in competition law actions for damages

Bueren, Eckart; Hüschelrath, Kai; Veith, Tobias - 2014

Public and private action against cartels is an internationally recognized cornerstone of antitrust enforcement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233583