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The joint cross section of stocks and options
An, Byeong-Je; Ang, Andrew; Bali, Turan G.; Cakici, Nusret - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 69 (2014) 5, pp. 2279-2337
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489666
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The joint cross section of stocks and options
An, Byeong-je; Ang, Andrew; Bali, Turan G.; Cakici, Nusret - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010210735
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Agency costs, executive compensation, and firm's choice of payout and financing policies
Babenko, Ilona - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003971713
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The compensational role of options in modern corporate governance
Stakić, Nikola - In: Megatrend review : the international review of applied … 8 (2011) 1, pp. 132-146
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009357399
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Indexing executive compensation contracts
Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst; Spalt, Oliver G. - In: The review of financial studies 26 (2013) 12, pp. 3182-3224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237368
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Option expensing and managerial equity incentives
Feng, Yi; Tian, Yisong Sam - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009518584
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CEO incentives : measurement, determinants, and impact on performance
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa; Tang, Hongfei - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524465
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Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation
Chaigneau, Pierre - In: The European journal of finance 21 (2015) 13/15, pp. 1357-1373
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419883
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Performance-based compensation and firm value : experimental evidence
Pfeiffer, Glenn M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Accounting horizons : a quarterly publication of the … 29 (2015) 4, pp. 777-798
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011428910
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How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949