Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation
Year of publication: |
October-December 2015
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre |
Published in: |
The European journal of finance. - Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN 1351-847X, ZDB-ID 1282412-4. - Vol. 21.2015, 13/15, p. 1357-1373
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Subject: | downside risk | executive compensation | principal-agent model | prudence | risk preferences | stock options | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Aktienoption | Stock option | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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