We consider a market where privately informed sellers resort to certification to overcome adverse selection. There is … U-shaped function of his reputation for accuracy: being perceived as more precise allows to attract more good sellers … but a high expected precision also deters bad sellers. Since the certifier tries to reach a balanced reputation to attract …

In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a … monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but … one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this …

reputation maximization, also embeds aspects of competition and feedback effects of the rating on the rated firms. Apart from …

How do lenders use their reputation when participating in syndicated loans? I address this question by focusing on … syndicate composition with respect to participants' reputation and its impact on loan spreads. I find that lender reputation … market finance features, rather than bank finance. However I find no evidence that lenders use their reputation and the …

This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have … strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices … that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a …