anticipation of this bailout undermines a bank's private incentive to impose a bail-in. In the resulting equilibrium, bail-ins are …We study the interaction between a government's bailout policy and banks' willingness to impose losses on (or \bail in …

system; any preset resolution system will be abandoned for a bailout if it would produce socially unacceptable loss … done ad hoc through Congress or should bailout authority be institutionalized in an agency? And second, should creditors of … bailed out firms be forced to accept less than full payment (or take a “haircut”) as part of the bailout? Ensuring …

We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting bailouts may signal firms' financial troubles and worsen … subsequent financing conditions. Bailout stigma can lead to low or even no take-up of otherwise attractive bailout offers, the … improving their subsequent funding conditions. Secret bailouts may not eliminate bailout stigma, but secrecy accompanied by …

to use most efficiently funds of new bank taxes. Method: By modeling the financial system with its interactions as …-bail-outs.' Compared to the current best practice of bank bail-outs, soft-bail-outs tend to reduce the probability of default of the whole … financial system, lower the bail-out costs, and decrease the bail-out cost volatility. Application: This new concept of soft …

of bail-outs. Raising public funds to conduct a bail-out entails the deadweight loss of distortionary taxation. Bank bail … domestic bank failures may be contemporaneous to sovereign crises, giving rise to risk-sharing motives to mutualize the funding … the public backstop and forbearance in early bank intervention in the fiscally stronger country, facilitating bail-outs in …

a bailout either if the bank is small in the economy or if the bank is large and the ex ante stability level of the bank …In a global game, I show that creditor bailins, when well-designed, can attain the exact same level of bank stability …

appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury - helped … attenuate bailout-related moral hazard. Banks were averse to these appointments - the empirical distribution of missed payments … exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury led to improved bank performance, lower CEO pay …

ap- point independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury … – helped attenuate bailout-related moral hazard. Banks were averse to these appointments – the empirical distribution of missed … payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury led to improved bank performance, lower …