Stability-equivalence of bailouts and bailins with welfare consequences
Year of publication: |
13 February 2024
|
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Authors: | Schilling, Linda |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | financial regulation | bank runs | global games | stability-equivalence | pol-icy effectiveness | bank resolution | haircuts | bailout | withdrawal fees | money marketmutual fund gates | suspension of convertibility | Theorie | Theory | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Bankenliquidität | Bank liquidity | Schuldenübernahme | Bailout | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten) |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP18832 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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