We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the price setting behavior in two-sided markets. We seek to answer two specific research questions: Do participants charge the equilibrium prices that can be derived from a theoretical model? How is the price setting affected by the characteristics...

Portuguese Abstract: Exploramos vários jogos diferenciais para simular a competição entre duas firmas em Preço, Publicidade, e Preço e Publicidade simultâneamente. Os resultados reforçam conclusões importantes na literatura e complementam-na, permitindo analisar a competição em dois...

Two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good. When the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions, we identify...

We conduct experiments testing the relationship between excess capacity and pricing in repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies and triopolies. We systematically vary the experimental markets between low excess capacity (suggesting monopoly) and no capacity constraints (suggesting perfect...

One of the hallmarks of competitive interaction is each firm’s desire to differentiate from rivals. Although differentiation may be achieved through product related choices, advertising levels may constitute another key mechanism. In this paper, we examine under what conditions firms will...

This paper investigates an emerging monetization mechanism for app developers – reward advertising. With reward ads, consumers have an option to view ads in exchange for a reward such as premium content. We investigate when and how an app developer should adopt reward ads as a mechanism for...

This paper models a generalized form of monopolistic competition such that consumers are differentiated horizontally by taste while firms are differentiated vertically by quality location. Consumers have quadratic transportation costs of disutility from consuming a non-ideal brand, and firms are...