This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

For almost 50 years field experiments have been used to study ethnic and racial discrimination in hiring decisions, consistently reporting high rates of discrimination against minority applicants - including immigrants -, irrespective of time, location, or minority groups tested. While Riach and...

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

We investigate the importance of employer preferences in explaining Sticky Floors, the pattern that women are, compared to men, less likely to start to climb the job ladder. To this end we perform a randomised field experiment in the Belgian labour market and test whether hiring discrimination...

I present a statistical discrimination model of the labor market in which employers endogenously learn about the productivity of worker groups through their hiring. Previous hiring experiences with groups shape subsequent incentives of profit-maximizing employers to hire from these groups again...

We analyze the impact of records of denied and withdrawn customer complaints on job separation in a dataset based on FINRA's Broker-Check database with more than 1 mio. financial advisers. Compared to misconduct that actually leads to a conviction of the adviser, denied and withdrawn complaints...

Wage transparency rules arguably enable workers better to assess their contribution to firm value, allowing them to make wage demands that more accurately reflect their value for the employing firm and to lower wage gaps in turn. This paper contains a formal analysis of transparency rules and...

This paper proposes a principal-agent model of labour market discrimination. In this model, the firm manager is a taste-based discriminator and has to make unobservable hiring decisions that determine the shareholder’s profits, because workers differ in skill. The model shows that...

Purpose – Research has shown that employers often disfavor racial minorities - particularly African Americans - even when whites and minorities present comparable resumes when applying for jobs. Extant studies have been hard pressed to distinguish between taste-based discrimination where...

We analyze the effect of employment-quota policies on the development of uncertainty and stereotypes in a model of inaccurate statistical discrimination with ambiguity about worker abilities. We show that, even if group characteristics are identical, higher uncertainty about one group can result...