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Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330
For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058
This paper studies how managerial compensation is shaped by the risk preference of shareholders. Firms with a large ownership held by "dual holders'' -- institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bonds of the company -- choose a less risk-inducing compensation structure....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848455
set ex ante explicit severance pay agreements as one component in managing the optimal level of equity incentives. Younger … post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089564
We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and the legal sector. Then, using a detailed survey of law school graduates, we explore why firms use long-term compensation. We find that individuals with jobs that make them highly visible and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064773
set ex ante explicit severance pay agreements as one component in managing the optimal level of equity incentives. Younger … post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116288
This paper examines why powerful CEOs are paid more in total compensation. Broadly, our results are consistent with the managerial ability view. First, CEO power is endogenously determined reflecting the CEO's ability. Specifically, founder-CEOs are more powerful than professional- and heir-CEOs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999536
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are frequently used to measure the effects of managerial incentives on corporate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927101
-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence … between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that it can explain … with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491928