Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...

Traditional finance theory suggests that riskier investments should yield higher returns. Challenging this notion, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that highly-incented managers may take on excessive risk, leading to greater losses, while other theoretical research argues that high...

We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament prizes do not differ between the workers(uniform prizes), as in the previous tournament literature, the outcome will be ineffcient. In the case of limited liability, the employer may benefit from...

Responding to the financial crisis of 2008, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) to “provide for financial regulatory reform” and to “protect consumers and investors[.]” Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act (“Section 951”)...

Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading,...

This paper develops an empirical approach to explicitly test two multi-agent moral hazard models on executive compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses which model is more robust at rationalizing the...

This paper develops an empirical approach to explicitly test two multi-agent moral hazard models on executive compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses which model is more robust at rationalizing the...

We examine whether and to what extent managers are evaluated, in their relative performance contracts, on the basis of systematic performance. Focusing on relative total shareholder returns (rTSR), the predominant metric specified in these contracts and used by market participants to evaluate...

This paper examines the consequences of the increased use of performance vesting provisions in long-term incentive compensation for CEOs and other executives in the post-2006 period following FAS 123R. We re-examine the agency prediction that incentives provided by accounting or other...

Many investors purchase open-end mutual funds through intermediaries, paying brokers and financial advisors for fund distribution and advice via alternative sale charge fee structures. We argue that the fee structure choice reveals valuable information about investors horizon. That allows...