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Compensation and Competition for Talent : Talent Scarcity or Incentives?

Giannetti, Mariassunta - 2014

. These findings suggest that long-term compensation arises in an optimal contract, because competition for talent accentuates …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064773

Organization Capital and Executive Performance Incentives

Gao, Mingze; Leung, Henry; Qiu, Buhui - 2021

We conjecture that a firm’s organization capital (OC) has a substitution effect on its executive pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) and empirically document a robust and significant substitution effect of OC on executive PPS. We use state-level unemployment insurance benefits as an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251641

Compensation and Employment Contracts of Powerful CEOs

Song, Wei-Ling - 2016

contracts that are disclosed publicly (or explicit) and rigid in contract terms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999536

Corporate Governance und Unternehmenserfolg : eine empirische Analyse des Zusammenhangs zwischen den Führungs-, Kontroll- und Anreizstrukturen und der Geschäftsentwicklung deutsche...

Steinbrecher, Johannes - 2016

, risk and efficiency. Compensation analyses show strong variation in compensation schemes between banks and bank divisions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011742813

The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts

Lund, Andrew - 2014

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058

CEO Optimism and Incentive Compensation

Otto, Clemens A. - 2014

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070717

Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts

Stark, Johanna - 2020

Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330

Value-Risk Tradeoffs and Managerial Incentives

Tsui, David - 2018

managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk … aversion creates potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. I also find that firms provide managers with … idiosyncratic (rather than systematic) risk and managers are more risk-averse. Collectively, these results suggest that firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936802

Managerial Incentives Explanation of Equity Carve-Outs Initial Returns

Seistrajkova, Biljana - 2017

This paper studies the first day return of 227 carve-outs during 1996-2013. I find that the first day return of newly issued subsidiary stocks is explained by the reporting distortions in the pre IPO period, conditioned on whether the executives and directors of the subsidiary received stock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970504

Optimal Executive Compensation : Stock Options or Restricted Stocks

Wu, Yan Wendy - 2020

This paper develops an agency model to analyze the optimality of executive stock option compensation in the presence of information manipulation. The analyses show that although information manipulation is positively related to the size of option compensation, the relative size of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857493

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