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Hard evidence and mechanism design
Bull, Jesse; Watson, Joel - In: Games and economic behavior 58 (2007) 1, pp. 75-93
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003407143
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Hard evidence and mechanism design
Bull, Jesse; Watson, Joel - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001711706
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Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
Ermolov, Andrew N. - In: Games and economic behavior 8 (1995) 2, pp. 349-363
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001176376
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Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003822584
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Framing the rabbit to snare the votes
Blumḳin, Tomer; Menirav, Ehud - In: Social choice and welfare 32 (2009) 4, pp. 603-634
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824446
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Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo - In: Social choice and welfare 36 (2011) 2, pp. 179-198
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839664
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Implementation with perfect information : a survey
Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Theoretical issues in development economics, (pp. 181-208). 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001285873
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Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
Terzopoulou, Zoi; Endriss, Ulle - In: Social choice and welfare 53 (2019) 3, pp. 415-442
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167703
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Implementation with Renegotiation When Preferences and Feasible Sets are State Dependent
Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo - 2013
In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infea- sible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renego- tiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equi-...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192915
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Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
Chen, Yi-chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1683-1717
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium …-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472500