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One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk … obtain that lower agent’s risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848346
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379118
This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency's total surplus within an linear agency framework with multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383032
incentives to affect these choices. It develops a multi-task model where employees makes choices between their assigned standard … tasks, for which the firm has a performance measure and provides incentives, and privately observed innovation opportunities …-powered incentives for standard tasks to encourage more innovation, yet in equilibrium employees undertake too few innovation. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212891
This paper seeks to explore how an agent's incentives to perform influences her performance. We analyze this question … show that the relationship between the incentives to perform and the expected performance could be negative. The paper thus … offers a novel, non-behavioral explanation for the failure of incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865018
Employees often learn about their ability while working, and the resulting beliefs interact with pay incentives to … job, dynamic selection, effort, and variation in pay incentives. The empirical analysis is based on unique data from a US … which pay incentives affect employment outcomes, profits, and compensation. Under the implemented and the profit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972627
This article explores a dynamic moral hazard setting in which a principal hires a team of agents for a project. As the project generates revenue upon completion, the principal incentivizes agents' efforts by designing bonuses for success. If bonuses are provided through spot or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014353011
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. The agent's performance evaluation is thereby incongruent, i.e. it does not perfectly reflect the relative contribution of the agent's multi-dimensional effort to firm's profit. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028223
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency relationship with a risk-neutral and financially constraint agent. The agent's performance evaluation is incongruent, i.e. it does not reflect his contribution to firm value, and thus motivates an inefficient effort allocation across tasks. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218745
high-powered incentives; otherwise, bonuses perform better …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247162