This article gives a brief introduction to reputation effects. A canonical model is described, the reputation bound … result of Fudenberg and Levine (1989 1992) and the temporary reputation result of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, 2007 …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …'s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …'s reputation is private …

maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about … types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect …

maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without … uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of …