-for training. Both channels lead to a decline in TFP. We test these implications in a large panel of Spanish manufacturing firms …

with respect to the ability of their employees when training is certified by credible external institutions. We apply an … institutions at that the end of apprenticeship training can be signalled to outside employers. Apprenticeship graduates however … cannot signal their work-related ability – measured by a small voluntary bonus paid by the training employer – to the outside …

firms. In renegotiation proof employment con- tracts, more productive firms provide more training. Both general and specific … training induce higher wages within jobs, and with future employers, even conditional on the future employer type. Because … at the opposite conclusion: That increased labor market friction reduces training in equilibrium …

firms. In renegotiation proof employment con- tracts, more productive firms provide more training. Both general and specific … training induce higher wages within jobs, and with future employers, even conditional on the future employer type. Because … at the opposite conclusion: That increased labor market friction reduces training in equilibrium …

smaller training costs, so that the welfare implications of each type of economy are a priori ambiguous: no model dominates …

to take up on-the-job training, to climb up the career ladder, or to eventually leave to professions more suitable to … overeducated workers have a significantly higher probability to take up on-the-job training than adequately educated workers and …