We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and...

We introduce voter uncertainty to the unidimensional spatial model of elections. Strategic voters choose between the status quo and a proposed reform, and there is uncertainty about the location of the reform on the policy space. If each possible location of the reform is on the same side of the...

We study the problem of aggregating private information in elections with two or more alternatives. We characterize environments where information can be aggregated asymptotically by a sequence of equilibria of voting games as the electorate grows large and explore the implications for the...

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate society's resources, and we allow for costly inter-group mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and...