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This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how...
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In an economic perspective, punitive damages and class actions can be viewed as sharing a common economic function – creating optimal deterrence. Building on Parisi and Cenini (2010), we study the effect of alternative procedural regimes on the effectiveness of punitive damages and class...
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implications of five potential behavioral responses (free-riding being one) to the adoption of team incentives with heterogeneous …
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Why do some leaders use praise as a means to motivate workers, while other leaders use social punishment? This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles depend on the prevailing labor-market conditions for workers. We show that the existence of a binding wage floor...
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We investigate patent litigation, settlements and R&D incentives on a market where two firms develop technologies of … there is no rent extraction by the PAE by distortion of R&D incentives …
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Independent central bankers and judges can both be more usefully viewed as trustees than as agents. A trust is a legal institution with rules set up by a settlor, administered by a trustee on behalf of beneficiaries. Public trustees often are motivated more by Pride, Policy, Place, and Power...
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