We revisit the information content of stock trading by corporate insiders with an expectation that opportunistic insiders will spread their trades over longer periods of time when they have a longer-lived informational advantage, and trade in a short window of time when their advantage is...

We present evidence that, following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firms responded to the increased requirement for outside director monitoring by substituting insiders with outside directors who have social or professional connections to their CEOs. This substitution was most...

We investigate if prior professional legal education either restrains or increases the extent to which the insider trades of company executives and directors are informed. We show that executives and directors with legal expertise (lawyer-insiders) earn significantly lower abnormal returns than...

Despite growing interest in various facets of the Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) position, there is very little research on CMO compensation. Accordingly, we set out to investigate the determinants of CMO compensation and its effect on firm performance. Employing the lens of agency theory, we...

We provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial institutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board members. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest and...

Insiders must disclose indirect trades made through accounts they control, including family, trust, retirement, and foundation accounts. Trades made in these indirect accounts are more profitable than direct trades in the insider's own account. In addition, indirect trades better predict...