In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good. For the case when all individuals have identical preferences in this paper a simple formula is derived that describes the proportion of all income...

This paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions. In the first stage of the game, the strategy variable for each country is the division of the provision of a continuum of public goods between the central and regional governments. In the second stage, the...

When the public provision of private goods is partial rather than universal, public supply may be supplemented by the entry of private firms in the market for the private good. The main purpose of this paper is to explore whether partial public provision helps or hinders aggregate access to the...

Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolution of cooperation in games governed by pairwise interactions. Here we determine to what extent this is true for games governed by group interactions. We therefore study the evolution of cooperation...

This paper is the second of two parts of a general theory of regulation. An effective regulatory system, whether created by a public legislative body or by private charter, must be coherent if it is to be successful. Coherence is a ‘property’ of well-designed regulatory systems. We suggest...

Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that after signing an oath people are as likely to vote for a public good in a...