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Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923234
Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011305
Recent international climate negotiations suggest that complete agreements are unlikely to materialize. Instead, partial cooperation between like-minded countries appears a more likely outcome. In this paper we analyze the effects of such partial cooperation between like-minded countries. In...
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In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of a public characteristic in divergent ways: While for one group it represents a public good, it is a public bad for another group. Applying Cornes' and Hartley's (2007) Aggregative Game Approach,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955751
In this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a diagrammatical exposition of matching mechanisms and their effects on public good supply and welfare. In particular, we describe, on...
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It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents’ preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314755