In this study, we ask: how does the intensity of internal competition for resources affect the communication of private information in an organization? Although competition between different divisions or units for resources is pervasive in many organizations, much of the accounting literature...

In this paper, we empirically examine the capital budgeting process of a large multi-divisional firm and the implications of the dynamics that underlie this process. Although investment decisions are one of the most important decisions made by firms, relatively little is known about the capital...

In a laboratory experiment I investigate the role of perceived own ability in a multi-task setting with career concerns under fixed wages and under financial incentives with a higher weight on the task measured with noise. I find that in the absence of career concerns participants allocate...

Investment decisions are among the most important managerial decisions. The purpose of this study is to examine whether non-diagnostic information in investment decisions elicits a dilution effect such that decision outcomes deviate from a Net Present Value (NPV) assessment. We also answer the...

Experimental research on individual decision-making with respect to effort is an important stream in management accounting research. There are two different concepts to operate effort in laboratory experiments, real effort, where participants are asked to perform an experimental task and chosen...

In an environment where capital market participants collectively possess superior information about a decision faced by a firm manager, we use an experimental market to analyze the effectiveness with which the market communicates this information to the manager through stock price. We do so in a...

We investigate a potential selection benefit of stock-based compensation for rank-and-file employees, whose pay under this compensation form is insensitive to their individual efforts. Using a laboratory experiment, where we control for both the timing and expected magnitude of compensation, we...