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When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323166
the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager’s employer. A necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379118
compensation to managers in low-tax jurisdictions, if payroll enters the FA formula. Managers in high-tax jurisdictions face the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010375838
compensation to managers in low-tax jurisdictions, if payroll enters the FA formula. Managers in high-tax jurisdictions face the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383849
It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539694
We address two apparent paradoxes of risk management: (1) managers hedge in order to avoid negative earnings surprises …, yet they tend to hedge risks uninformative of the value of the company; and (2) the presence of options in managers … informational asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors). Investors derive information about company value from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092522
We collect detailed survey data on financial managers' annual bonus plans and extensively validate a measure of the … financial targets are positively associated with financial managers' willingness to engage in unethical behavior. In contrast … find that willingness to engage in unethical behavior is lower when financial managers are close to retirement, when they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076279
This paper examines how changes in CEO risk-taking incentives are associated with changes in the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO contracts. Using a shock to the accounting for executive stock options (FAS 123R), I confirm that risk-taking incentives and option grants declined...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940307
quality managers are weeded out by the firm, and 2) high quality managers leave because firms are unable to adjust their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012864757
While numerous studies have examined the impact that powerful CEOs have on their compensation and overall firm decisions, relatively little is known about how powerful CFOs influence their compensation and important firm financial reporting and operational outcomes. This is somewhat surprising...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974079