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The choice of the agenda in labor negotiations : efficiency and behavioral considerations
Königstein, Manfred (contributor);  … - 2005
The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are … wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports … an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003115148
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
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Revisiting Gender Differences in Ultimatum Bargaining : Experimental Evidence from the US and China
Li, Shuwen - 2018
We report results from a replication of Solnick (2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnick's (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932557
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Rethinking political bargaining : policymaking with a single proposer
Primo, David M. - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 18 (2002) 2, pp. 411-427
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001704694
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Performance pay and the erosion of worker cooperation: field experimental evidence
Burks, Stephen V.; Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Goette, Lorenz - 2006
We report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267460
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First-mover disadvantage
Mylovanov, Tymofiy - 2006
This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which … parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher … ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is selected by her opponent rather than by herself. In the model, the buyer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373494
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Performance pay and the erosion of worker cooperation : field experimental evidence
Burks, Stephen V. (contributor);  … - 2006
We report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003292055
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(Just) first time lucky? : the impact of single versus multiple bank lending relationships on firms and banks' behavior
Barboni, Giorgia; Treibich, Tania - 2012
The widespread evidence of multiple bank lending relationships in credit markets suggests that firms are interested in setting up a diversity of banking links. However, it is hard to know from the empirical data whether a firm's observed number of lenders is symptomatic of financial constraints...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580552
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When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Dürsch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013 - Revised version
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743040