Nonprofit organizations have been recently mandated to disclose the details of their executives' compensation packages. Contract information is now accessible not only to current and prospective donors, but also to rival nonprofit organizations competing for donations in the fundraising market....

The observability of managerial contract information in duopolies with strategic delegation has been an issue of controversial discussion. In a recent paper, Baik and Lee (2019) endogenize the decision to disclose the details of managerial contracts and show that in equilibrium, the owners of...

Nonprofit organizations have been recently mandated to disclose the details of their executives' compensation packages. Contract information is now accessible not only to current and prospective donors, but also to rival nonprofit organizations competing for donations in the fundraising market....

The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where...

Nonprofit organizations have been recently mandated to disclose the details of their executives’ compensation packages. Contract information is now accessible not only to current and prospective donors, but also to rival nonprofit organizations competing for donations in the fundraising...