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Optimal contracting with verifiable ex post signals

Kessler, Anke S.; Lülfesmann, Christoph; Schmitz, … - 2000

We study an adverse selection problem in which information that is imperfectly correlated with the agent's type becomes public ex post. Unbounded penalties are ruled out by assuming that the agent is wealth constrained. The following conclusions emerge. If the agent's utility is increasing in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538996

Optimal contracting in agency with verifiable ex post information

Kessler, Anke - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013424018

Bilateral bargaining under non-verifiable information

Kessler, Anke S.; Lülfesmann, Christoph - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993129

Bilateral bargaining, unverifiable quality, and options to return

Kessler, Anke S.; Lülfesmann, Christoph - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 23 (2004) 2, pp. 395-410

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001871217

Revisiting the lemons market

Kessler, Anke S. - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000960030

Revisiting the lemons market

Kessler, Anke S. - In: International economic review 42 (2001) 1, pp. 25-41

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001562202

Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003355333

Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: European economic review : EER 51 (2007) 4, pp. 859-870

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003464333

The negotiators who knew too much : transaction costs and incomplete information

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011502370

The negotiators who knew too much : transaction costs and incomplete information

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 145 (2016), pp. 33-37

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011618147

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