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Existence of optimal strategies in Markov games with incomplete information

Neyman, Abraham - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 37 (2008) 4, pp. 581-596

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003797626

The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration

Neyman, Abraham - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 41 (2012) 1, pp. 195-207

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Ability and knowledge

Gossner, Olivier - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 1, pp. 95-106

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The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration

Neyman, Abraham - 2009

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Repeated games with public uncertain duration process

Neyman, Abraham; Sorin, Sylvain - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 39 (2010) 1/2, pp. 29-52

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The maximal variation of martingales of probabilities and repeated games with incomplete information

Neyman, Abraham - 2009

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Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information : the general symmetric case

Neyman, Abraham; Sorin, Sylvain - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 27 (1998) 2, pp. 201-210

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Cooperation in repeated games when the number of stages is not commonly known

Neyman, Abraham - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 67 (1999) 1, pp. 45-64

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Game and economic theory : selected contributions in honor of Robert J. Aumann

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Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information : The General Symmetric Case

Neyman, Abraham; Sorin, Sylvain - 1998

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209435