This study adopts behavioral contract theory through a mathematical model and clarifies the situation in which a fixed–salary contract is preferable to incentives–based one for the principal. Theoretically, the expected utility for the principal is higher under an incentives–based contract...

When working together, people engage in non-contractual and informal interactions that constitute the sociology of the group. We use behavioral models and a unique survey of medical groups to analyze how group sociology influences physician incentive pay and behavior. We conclude that informal...

This study analyzes the relationship between discriminatory social attitudes and the variation of within-firm pay gaps by combining data on regional votes on gender equality laws with a data set of multi-establishments firms and their workers. The data set allows us for the first time to study...

We analyze the relationship between social attitudes on gender equality and firms' pay-setting behavior by combining information about regional votes relative to gender equality laws with a large data set of multi-branch firms and workers. The results show that multi-branch firms pay more...

We analyze the relationship between social attitudes on gender equality and firms' pay-setting behavior by combining information about regional votes relative to gender equality laws with a large data set of multi-branch firms and workers. The results show that multi-branch firms pay more...

Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously-awarded incentive compensation from managers involved in accounting manipulation or misconduct. I study theoretically and empirically the impact of clawback provisions on the horizon of executive pay when shareholders face clawback...

Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...

This paper examines multi-period compensation contracts when retirement is anticipated. Short-term contracts in long-term employment relationships are equivalent to a long-term renegotiation-proof contract. The dynamic of incentive rates is determined by (i) how and in which periods managerial...

I study the implications of agency frictions for the pricing policy of institutional market makers. In a setting where a market maker cannot observe the actions of an employed trader, I derive the optimal compensation structure and pricing policy. The theory demonstrates that incentive...

We provide empirical tests to evaluate the impact of clawback enforcement heterogeneity on the horizon of executive compensation. Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously-awarded incentive compensation after the discovery of accounting manipulation or misconduct. We deal...