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characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with preplay communication in which players have private preferences over …An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We … the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of …
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characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over …An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We … the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of …
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We define and characterize the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication …
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preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated …
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