We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...

Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results come from experiments with bargaining power allocated exogenously, so that individualsmay perceive it as having been...

We revisit the Nash model for two-person bargaining. A mediator knows agents' ordinal preferences over feasible proposals, but has incomplete information about their acceptance thresholds. We provide a behavioural characterisation under which the mediator recommends a proposal that maximises the...

We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games. First, imposing strict experimental control of the behavior of the receiving players and focusing on the behavior of the proposers, we show...

In order to formalize the act of agreement between two individuals, the concept of consensus functional equation, for a bi-variate map defined on an abstract choice set, is introduced. Then, and in a purely choice-theoretical framework, we relate the solutions of this equation to the notion of a...

In order to formalize the act of agreement between two individuals, the concept of consensus functional equation, for a bi-variate map defined on an abstract choice set, is introduced. Then, and in a purely choice-theoretical framework, we relate the solutions of this equation to the notion of a...