Showing 1 - 10 of 135
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013185348
This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324948
The paper discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors,also known as the Selectope. First, we reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors, published by Vasil'ev in the late 1970's, within a more general framework. In particular, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324857
cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions … distributing dividends. In this paper we consider games with limited communication structure in which the edges or links of an … if and only if they are connected. For such games we discuss Harsanyi solutions whose dividend shares are based on power …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325275
allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are … 'games with ordered players' which is based on the distribution of 'dividends' taking into account the hierarchical ordering … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325794
This paper provides a co-operative as well as a non-cooperative analysis of weighted majority games. The co … contains the Core, it eliminates the "dominated" coalition structures, and has sharp implications for weighted majority games …: for such games it is non-empty, it predicts a unique stable demand vector for every homogeneous representation, and every …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608407
Several theoretical contributions, starting with McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980), have suggested to model household behavior as a Nash-bargaining game. Since then, very few attempts have been made to operationalize cooperative models of household labor supply for policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262203
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264274
Governments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental) and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt compromise in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265409
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a newcomer in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267121