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Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623050
We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014265847
This paper studies a dynamic bargaining model with informational externalities between bargaining pairs. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the price they will pay for their work while its cost is agents' private information and correlated between them. The principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094968
to guarantee internal stability and to maximize the sum of utilities of coalition members. The transfers scheme is tested …, einer Koalition beizutreten oder nicht. Bezüglich der Koalitionäre wird kollektive Wohlfahrtsmaximierung angenommen …, Outsider handeln individuell rational. Für die Aufteilung des durch die Koalition generierten Effizienzgewinns wird ein …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012285892
In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339399
Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332824
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386160
We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806593
on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of … countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable … minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488278
majority coalition can be stable, provided that reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread. In addition, a stable … minority coalition can exist, even with weak reciprocity preferences. This latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum … stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010400178