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Optimism and commitment : an elementary theory of bargaining and war
Ponsatí, Clara; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 157-179
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506420
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Terrorism, Bargaining, and Credible Commitments
Young, Joseph K.; Findley, Michael - 2014
What explains the variation in terrorism within and across political regimes? We contend that terrorism is most likely … judiciaries make government commitments more credible, thereby providing less incentive for the use of terrorism. Using a recently … analyses appropriate for the challenges of terrorism data and then examine the robustness of the results. The results provide …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200285
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Splitting games : Nash equilibrium and the optimisation problem
Martins, Ana Paula - 2010
This research states the stylised n (more than two) players' splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524731
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Chapter 22 Economics of Conflict: An Overview
Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 649-709). 2007
In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conflict and appropriation. Allowing for the possibility of conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced, represents a significant departure from the traditional paradigm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024407
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Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution : efficiency-free characterizations
Nakamura, Kensei - In: Social choice and welfare 62 (2024) 4, pp. 629-642
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014551291
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Estimating the influence of fairness on bargaining behavior
De Bruyn, Arnaud; Bolton, Gary E. - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 54 (2008) 10, pp. 1774-1791
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003776070
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Morals from rationality alone? : some doubts
Messina, JP; Wiens, David - In: Politics, philosophy & economics : ppe 19 (2020) 3, pp. 248-273
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012271394
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The influence of secrecy on the communication structure of covert networks
Lindelauf, Roy (contributor); Borm, Peter (contributor);  … - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003736604
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On heterogeneous covert networks
Lindelauf, Roy (contributor); Borm, Peter (contributor);  … - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003752309
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On Heterogeneous Covert Networks
Lindelauf, Roy H. A.; Borm, Peter; Hamers, Herbert - 2008
Covert organizations are constantly faced with a tradeoff between secrecy and operational effciency. Lindelauf, Borm and Hamers (2008) developed a theoretical framework to determine optimal homogeneous networks taking the above mentioned considerations explicitly into account. In this paper this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218001