Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 361
Cover Image
Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown
Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079
Cover Image
Contract Litigation as Information Revelation Channel and its Implications on Reputation (Dis)Incentives
Tzang, F.L. Philip - 2011
We examine how the reputation concern of contracting parties affects contractual incentives if information is … revealed to future buyers only if contractual disputes are litigated. We show that the seller's reputation concern acts like an … additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125615
Cover Image
Random inspections and periodic reviews : optimal dynamic monitoring
Varas, Felipe; Marinovic, Iván; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - 2018
reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays … two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of inspections affect agent's reputation, and an informational role because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865082
Cover Image
Effects of the menu of loan contracts on borrower behavior
Abraham, Katharine G.; Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Ozbay, Erkut Y.; … - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 1, pp. 509-528
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012821211
Cover Image
Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance
Olivella, Pau; Vera-Hernandez, Marcos - 2006
We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine private health insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider a purely private system or a system in which private insurance supplements a public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately funded health...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292988
Cover Image
Randomization in contracts with endogenous information
Terstiege, Stefan - 2011
I consider a situation, where the agent can acquire payoff-relevant information either before or after the contract is signed. To raise efficiency, the principal might solicit information; to retain all surplus, however, she must prevent precontractual information gathering. The following class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293370
Cover Image
Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2008
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299151
Cover Image
Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard
Laux, Christian - 2008
The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm's risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm's objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303689
Cover Image
Ärztliche Leistung und Compliance des Patienten: Der Fall des Double Moral Hazard
Schneider, Urs - 1999
The relationship between physician and patient has been discussed intensively in the literature. Nevertheless, they neglect the fact that the production of health not only depends on the medical services supplied by the physician but is also influenced by the patient's compliance. We present a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306063
Cover Image
Communicating Subjective Evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2013
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide some justifications by sending a costly message. Indeed, it is optimal for the principal to explain her evaluation to the agent if and only if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323871