Showing 1 - 10 of 186
This paper examines to what extent the distribution of votes and voting behavior of people with different employment status are affected by regional differences in corruption. Using data from the Russian Parliamentary (State Duma) Elections 1999 and 2003, I develop and estimate a SUR system of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188400
Traditional political economy has paid primary attention to the structuring of the principal-agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political agents. However, as the electoral control of politicians and the credibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390689
Using actual voting records of simultaneous elections held for Indian federal and regional assemblies -- where same political parties contest against each other in both type of elections -- we identify swing voters. We find that the representatives supported by swing voters outperform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970508
We analyze the determinants of the excessive administrative spending of local governments in Indonesia. In an unbalanced panel data set of 399 districts for 2001‐2009, we show that the proliferation of districts has not led to increased administrative spending; instead a lack of political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010188515
Much has been written about politicians' preferences for electoral systems, yet little is known about the preferences of voters. In 1993, New Zealand had a binding electoral referendum on the same day as the general election where voters chose between keeping a single plurality system (First...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011731918
Using actual voting records of simultaneous elections held for Indian federal and regional assemblies-where same political parties contest against each other in both type of elections we identify non-committed voters. These are split ticket voters who vote for different parties in two different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947738
This paper examines how bureaucracy affects political accountability and electoral selection, using a three-tier political agency model with voters, politicians and bureaucrats. In the model's hierarchy, politicians are constrained by election while bureaucrats are controlled by the budget....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981308
Numerous cities across the U.S. have recently switched to ranked choice voting in their local mayoral elections. Proponents argue that, by allowing voters to fully express their preferences over the candidates, voter satisfaction and, ultimately, turnout will improve. Opponents are concerned...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084645
Traditional political economy has paid primary attention to the structuring of the principal-agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political agents. However, as the electoral control of politicians and the credibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772195
Electoral competition is a democratic mechanism to guarantee high governmental performance. In reality, however, it often leads to policy failure due to Government Capture and Government Accountability. An understanding of both phenomena has to be based on voter theory and nowadays the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022804