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Kiss, Hubert Janos - 2019

There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871693

Coopetition in group contest

Kiss, Hubert J.; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso; Zhukova, Vita - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016453

Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma

Engel, Christoph - 2006

. It is routinely analysed in terms of game theory. Much less frequently, however, an obvious parallel is drawn. For cartel …A cartel is socially not desirable. But is it a normative problem? And has merger control reason to be concerned about … tacit collusion? Neither is evident once one has seen that the members of a cartel face a problem of strategic interaction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058244

Tournaments, Coalitions, and Truthfulness

Brown, Murray; Chiang, Shin-Hwan - 2008

effort and sabotage on a prize set by a principal) is extended to allow for coalitions. Using a sequential coalition … formation model with a coalition externality (larger coalitions make self-enforcing sabotage and synergy strategies more … effective), coalition members coordinate their sabotage-synergy activities. Our main result is a sufficient condition for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072263

Strategic mismatches in competing teams

Kräkel, Matthias - 1999

This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001442145

Optimal contest design when the designer's payoff depends on competitive balance

Runkel, Marco - 2003

This paper investigates optimal contest design when the designer's payoff is increasing in competitive balance between contestants. A two-player contest with asymmetric effort costs (asymmetric abilities) is considered. Competitive balance is measured by the difference in winning probabilities...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001784223

Altruism and envy in contests : an evolutionarily stable symbiosis

Konrad, Kai A. - 2002

Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001737581

Attention Competition

Hefti, Andreas - 2012

I present a game-theoretic model where economic competition and attention competition are interdependent. On the one hand the effort to attract consumer attention depends on the value of attention to the firm which depends on the grade of price competition among all perceived firms. On the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111461

Satisficing in sales competition : experimental evidence

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655973

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822063