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Coopetition in Group Contest
Kiss, Hubert Janos - 2019
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871693
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Coopetition in group contest
Kiss, Hubert J.; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso; Zhukova, Vita - 2019
There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016453
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Prize Sharing Rules in Collective Contests : When Does Group Size Matter?
Gupta, Dhritiman - 2020
In this paper we deal with situations of collective contests between two groups over a private prize. A well known way to divide the prize within the winning group is the prize sharing rule introduced by Nitzan, 1991. Since its introduction it has become a standard in the collective contests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827736
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Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma
Engel, Christoph - 2006
. It is routinely analysed in terms of game theory. Much less frequently, however, an obvious parallel is drawn. For cartel …A cartel is socially not desirable. But is it a normative problem? And has merger control reason to be concerned about … tacit collusion? Neither is evident once one has seen that the members of a cartel face a problem of strategic interaction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058244
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Tournaments, Coalitions, and Truthfulness
Brown, Murray; Chiang, Shin-Hwan - 2008
effort and sabotage on a prize set by a principal) is extended to allow for coalitions. Using a sequential coalition … formation model with a coalition externality (larger coalitions make self-enforcing sabotage and synergy strategies more … effective), coalition members coordinate their sabotage-synergy activities. Our main result is a sufficient condition for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072263
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Imperfect certification
Gu, Yiquan (contributor) - 2008
This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect testing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two products are tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than the lower quality one. When only one certifier with such testing technology is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003785058
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Satisficing in sales competition : experimental evidence
Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2009
to adjust aspiration levels if they cannot be satisfied. -- satisficing behavior ; duopoly ; profit aspiration ; theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009734685
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Optimal contest design when the designer s payoff depends on competitive balance
Runkel, Marco - 2003
This paper investigates optimal contest design when the designer s payoff is increasing in competitive balance between contestants. A two-player contest with asymmetric effort costs (asymmetric abilities) is considered. Competitive balance is measured by the difference in winning probabilities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509371
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Altruism and envy in contests : an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
Konrad, Kai A. - 2002
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514081
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Selecting a Unique Competitive Equilibrium with Default Penalties
Qin, Cheng-Zhong - 2009
The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow default subject to penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can be applied to uniquely select any competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158128