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Time to defect: repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments with uncertain horizon

Bruttel, Lisa V.; Güth, Werner; Kamecke, Ulrich - 2007

Using a symmetric 2-person prisoners' dilemma as the base game, each player receives a signal for the number of rounds to be played with the same partner. The actual number of rounds (the length of the supergame) is determined by the maximal signal where each player expects the other's signal to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271839

Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end

Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Güth, Werner; Kamecke, Ulrich - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 41 (2012) 1, pp. 23-47

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511733

Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? : an experimental test of finite-horizon folk theorems

Angelova, Vera; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Güth, Werner; … - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 51 (2013) 2, pp. 1345-1356

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751066

Infinity in the lab : how do people play repeated games?

Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Kamecke, Ulrich - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 72 (2012) 2, pp. 204-219

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009513958

Time to defect : repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments with uncertain horizon

Bruttel, Lisa (contributor); Güth, Werner (contributor); … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647905

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