A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...

This paper studies repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We introduce the condition of dynamic monotonicity and show that it is necessary for repeated implementation in finite as well as infinite horizon problems....

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We de?ne dynamic mono- tonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost suf?cient for repeated...

We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...

Recent laboratory experiments support the popular view that the introduction of corporate leniency programs has significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid...

We examine the novel concept for repeated noncooperative games with bounded rationality: "Nash-2" equilibrium, called also "threatening-proof profile" in [16, Iskakov M., Iskakov A., 2012b]. It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not...

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose...

We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in...

Recent laboratory experiments support the popular view that the introduction of corporate leniency programs has significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid...

We examine experimentally how humans behave when they play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pure minimax strategy. A minority of subjects' play was consistent with their Nash...