Showing 1 - 10 of 1,402
choices of the other generations. We analyse this situation as one of bargaining á la Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson [15 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287805
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320421
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012264692
How agents assess the (in-)tangible externalities that others might impose on them can strongly influence strategic interaction. This study explores mechanism design for agents whose externality assessments and private payoffs, exclusive of externalities, are all subject to asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773839
experiment compares one-shot and indefinite horizon versions of random-proposer majority bargaining (the Baron-Ferejohn game … and bargaining games from three seminal social preference experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762571
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956071
easy. In our stochastic (alternating offer) bargaining experiment, there is a certain first-period pie and a known finite …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291818
In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive … war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the … the relative bargaining position changes substantially. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292375
-person bargaining game where the other party's gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect … and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293381