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We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894
preferences of principal and agent are exogenously aligned. As application, the commitment effect of empowerment is considered … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102
-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
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We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325071
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486679
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012505088
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010417573